INTERNATIONALIZATION OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES THROUGH FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
RESUMO

Empresas estatais são criadas para se concentrarem em necessidades domésticas, no entanto evidências apontam para o crescimento do investimento estrangeiro direto no exterior por empresas estatais. As teorias existentes no campo de negócios internacionais focalizam motivos para internacionalização com base em eficiência, portanto não captam plenamente as dinâmicas da internacionalização das empresas estatais. Integramos a teoria dos campos de administração pública e negócios internacionais para desenvolver proposições que combinem as seguintes questões: por que empresas estatais se internacionalizam, quais são as motivações dessas empresas e quais as principais consequências gerenciais de sua internacionalização. Nossos achados sugerem que as empresas estatais demonstram pouca hesitação para entrar em mercados internacionais e que sua expansão internacional não é contraditória com os objetivos da propriedade estatal, se o propósito é ajustar a empresa a ambientes institucionais em transformação tanto nos mercados domésticos quanto nos internacionais. Nossas proposições sobre a internacionalização de empresas estatais baseiam-se em um estudo de caso aprofundado do investimento estrangeiro direto no exterior, conduzido pela estatal brasileira Petrobras nas últimas três décadas. PALAVRAS-CHAVE | Empresas estatais, internacionalização, mercados emergentes, teorias de negócios internacionais com base em eficiência, teorias de administração pública com base sociopolítica.
RESUMEN
Las empresas de propiedad del estado (EPE) se crean para satisfacer las necesidades nacionales, sin embargo, pruebas recientes señalan un aumento en la inversión extranjera directa en el exterior de las EPE. Las teorías existentes sobre Negocios Internacionales (NI) mencionan motivos relacionados con la eficiencia para la internacionalización; por lo tanto, no reflejan plenamente la dinámica de internalización de las EPE, que son conducidas en gran medida por factores políticos y consideraciones de bienestar social. Integramos las teorías de gestión pública y de NI para desarrollar proposiciones que respondan a las siguientes preguntas: por qué las empresas estatales se internacionalizan; cuáles son sus motivaciones, y cuáles son los principales resultados de gestión de la internacionalización de las EPE. Nuestros hallazgos sugieren que las EPE muestran pocas dudas en entrar en mercados internacionales, y que su expansión internacional no se contrapone a los objetivos de la propiedad estatal, si la finalidad es ajustar la empresa a entornos institucionales cambiantes, tanto en mercados nacionales e internacionales. Nuestras proposiciones sobre la internacionalización de EPE se basan en un profundo estudio de caso de inversión extranjera directa en el exterior llevada a cabo por la brasileña Petrobras en las últimas tres décadas. PALABRAS CLAVE | Empresas de propiedad del Estado, internacionalización, mercados emergentes, teorías de negocios internacionales basados en la eficiencia, teoría socio-político basada en la gestión pública.
INTRODUCTION
Since the 1990s, a significant number of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have internationalized and are today among some of the world's largest multinationals (UNCTAD, 2012; Sauvant & Strauss, 2012) . The World Investment Report (2012) indicates that there are currently at least 650 multinational SOEs (MSOEs) with more than 8500 foreign affiliates, about 56% of which are from developing economies and 44% from advanced economies. SOEs are hybrid organizations with both market orientation and socio-political goals (Ramamurti, 1987; Vernon, 1979) . what is being accomplished through SOEs' OFDI? Although public management theory (e.g., Hood, 1995; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011) has traditionally been used to explain the socio-political existence of SOEs, it has not focused on explaining why SOEs internationalize (Choudhury & Khanna, 2014) . Second, what are the motivations of SOEs' internationalization? Third, what are the main managerial outcomes of SOEs' internationalization?
Efficiency-based IB theories of internationalization such as the Uppsala internationalization model (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977 ) or Dunning's Eclectic Paradigm (Dunning 2001) have not focused on the motivations of SOE internationalization nor on the managerial outcomes that internationalization can bring to hybrid organizations like the SOEs (Bass & Chakrabarty, 2014) .
In this paper, we combine these three questions: why SOEs internationalize? What are their motivations? What are the main managerial outcomes of SOEs' internationalization? We build on the phenomenon of SOE internationalization -specifically through OFDI -by presenting the logic of a multinational SOE as both a legitimate political agent and a market player satisfying shareholders' interests. Based on in-depth longitudinal analysis of a large Brazilian SOE as our descriptive and analytical setting, we aim to enhance our understanding of the unique aspects of governments' pursuit of international markets through their SOEs' OFDI strategies.
In the next section, we summarize three different views on the internationalization of SOEs. We then present our research design, followed by our propositions in subsequent sections.
Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings and conclude with ideas for future research.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Multinational state-owned enterprises (MSOEs) are "legally independent firms with direct ownership by the state that have value adding activities outside its home country. These valueadded activities can be production facilities or sales subsidiaries, or purchasing subsidiaries or design or R&D centers." (CuervoCazurra et al., 2014, p. 925) . Since we use the definition of Cuervo-Cazurra et al. (2014) of multinational state-owned enterprise (MSOE), we will focus on OFDI (i.e., the SOE must have a subsidiary abroad) rather than analyze internationalization through SOEs' export strategies.
We summarize the key assumptions and implications concerning internationalization in existing public management theories (in which the state is the main owner of the firm) and IB theories (in which a private party is the main owner of the firm) in Exhibit 1. Exhibit 1 illustrates that, in the perspective of public management theory, SOEs do not have to internationalize, since they fulfill governments' social mandates. However, in the perspective of IB theory, private-owned companies have to internationalize to stay competitive. Public management theory notes that if SOEs internationalize, they tend to do so in a riskseeking manner as they expand to other countries with similarly unstable governments -i.e., both politically and institutionallyand rich in natural resources (Ramasamy et al., 2012) . Conversely, both the Uppsala model and Dunning's eclectic paradigm perceive private-owned firms as more risk-averse as they tend to internationalize to stable countries for strategic asset seeking purposes (Ramaswamy et al., 2012) .
The current lack of integration between public management and IB theories has produced three different views on SOE internationalization focusing on either the SOE or the internationalization aspect of the phenomenon. We will first summarize these views, then suggest a way to integrate both aspects into propositions of SOE internationalization through OFDI. 
View 1: State ownership as a deterrent to SOE internationalization
Until the late 1980s, IB scholars' attention focused on the internationalization of large multinational companies from the United States, Europe, or Japan (Dunning, 2001; Johanson & Valhene, 1977; Williamson, 1975) . Their focus has been exclusively on the firm level and has largely ignored the unique aspects of governments as owners (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2014) . Only a few studies (e.g., Lamont, 1976; Mazzolini, 1980; Ramamurti, 1987; Vernon, 1979) demonstrate internationalization cases of SOEs between World War II and the 1980s. The scarcity of studies on internationalization of SOEs during this period can be explained by the fact that most SOEs were operating basically in their domestic markets.
The field of mainstream literature that has focused on SOEs is public management, reporting on domestic public sector reforms, which, in most countries, took place in the 1990s (Hood, 1995; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011) . This literature has assumed that SOEs are driven largely by public policies of social welfare, economic development of a particular sector in the home country. However, these studies contain little mention of SOEs international investments (Hood, 1995) . The first authors in IB that had studied SOEs did so in the perspective of public management, and have traditionally assumed state ownership to reduce the likelihood that a company will expand abroad (Lamont, 1976; Mazzolini, 1980; Vernon, 1979) . Vernon (1979) formalized this perspective, and his arguments have emerged as a predominant explanation of SOEs' internationalization: " [t] he expectation that the state enterprise will favor national sources would apply not only to SOEs engaged in production but also to state entities engaged primarily in trading" (p. 11).
These first studies (Lamont, 1976; Mazzolini, 1980; Vernon, 1979) have three main arguments to explain why SOEs' internationalization is, for reasons other than social mandates, contradictory to the goals of state-ownership.
First, SOEs are typically used as a tool by governments' entrepreneurial drive to create or improve certain industries where private entrepreneurship is not possible or not desirable due to economic or resource constraints in the country (Vernon, 1979) .
Second, governments often caution against negative effects of SOEs' international investments (OFDI), particularly concerning domestic employment rates (Mazzolini, 1980) . Additionally, productive plants abroad are seen as taking the place of exports to foreign markets, therefore negatively impacting the balance of payments (Mazzolini, 1980) .Third, governments are primarily concerned with domestic issues and this necessarily influences SOE managers. Because they are appointed by the government and accountable to it, their attitudes reflect the goals and ambitions of politicians, as well as political interests (Mazzolini, 1980) . These pioneering studies on SOEs have provided an incomplete explanation for the internationalization of SOEs (Cui & Jiang, 2012) .
View 2: Pro-market reforms as incentives to SOE internationalization
The second main explanation for SOE internationalization emerged in the 1980s and 1990s, particularly in the literature on pro-market reforms (Cerny, 1997; Clifton Comín, & Díaz-Fuentes, 2011; Cuervo-Cazurra & Dau, 2009; Dau, 2012) . Pro-market reforms are institutional changes made by the state that were first implemented in the United Kingdom by Margaret Thatcher, and then conducted in several other developed and developing countries (Musacchio & Flores-Macias, 2009; North, 1990) . Promarket reforms included the adoption of policies such as price liberalization, trade liberalization, full or partial privatization, liberalization of FDI inflows, and industry deregulation (by abolishing barriers to entry and exit particularly to foreign competition) (Rodrik, 2006) . Pro-market reforms have been seen to enhance SOE internationalization (e.g., Rodrik, 2006) . First, pro-market reforms exposed domestic firms to international competition by reducing regulatory constraints and dropping restrictions on imports and foreign investors (Dau, 2012) . The increased competition in the local market has established a new institutional environment that permitted, and in some cases "forced", domestic firms to expand their operations abroad (Dau, 2012) . While these reforms affected all firms in the domestic market (private or SOE), they affected SOEs even more due to the latter's under-developed market skills and long exposure to government influence (Dau, 2012) .
Second, pro-market reforms also have brought a wave of full and partial privatization which changed the configuration of state-ownership (Gupta, 2005) . Under the higher expectations of private stockholders, even in cases they are the minority, SOEs are forced to enhance internal management and performance (Gupta, 2005) and respond to the competition by seeking more profitable international markets (Clifton et al., 2011) .
Third, pro-market reforms also transformed the political agenda in most countries, which has changed SOEs' internationalization logic (Cerny, 1997) : government policies shifted from the development of strategic sectors to development of internationally competitive key sectors; emphasis was placed on inflation control and exchange rate stability; and the focal point of welfare shifted from full employment, redistributive transfer payments, and social service to the promotion of enterprise, innovation and profitability in both private and public sectors (Cerny, 1997) . Governments' political agendas have become more concerned with international issues, and SOEs as assets of government institutions (Cui & Jiang, 2012) are becoming much more active in international markets.
Besides the fact that the literature on pro-market reforms has assumed SOEs to have a more active role in international markets after the reforms, this perspective has not presented a theoretical development on international SOEs. Dau (2012) has confirmed that SOEs are more affected by pro-market reforms, but his focus was not on SOE internationalization per se.
View 3: Unique aspects of governments as owners in SOEs' internationalization
In addition to the public management (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011; Vernon, 1979) and pro-market reform (Dau, 2012) First, for SOEs, internationalization may have a political side. In many circumstances, SOEs may internationalize to achieve political objectives that have little to do with the profitability logic. International Business (IB) literature tends to assume that private companies become multinationals to increase their profitability (profit-maximizing logic) as they seek markets, natural resources, strategic assets or efficiency (Dunning, 2001) . Although SOEs can make certain international investments (OFDI) with the profitability logic like private multinational enterprises (MNEs), in many cases, the governments that control them can lead them to invest abroad to achieve political purposes rather than profitability or financial performance (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2014) .
Second, as SOEs decide to internationalize, their location choice also has a political logic, and OFDI may not be driven by profitability as Dunning's theory has predicted (Dunning, 2001) . In many cases, SOEs choose a country to invest in with the purpose of achieving goals of their home governments' foreign policy or to expand their zone of influence among international targets, rather than being guided by the competitive benefits of a particular target country (Ramasamy, Yeung, & Laforet et al., 2012) . As a result, SOEs can enter countries considered risky or unattractive to private companies (Ramasamy et al., 2012; Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2014) . which enables them to take more risks (Ramasamy et al., 2012) .
Additionally, governments have control over laws and regulations that enable them to enforce contracts and reduce risks for their SOEs' international investments. As a result, compared to private companies, SOEs are both more likely and more willing to make a risky OFDI, which is typically performed through acquisitions and greenfield ventures (Ramasamy et al., 2012) in countries with weaker rule of law or higher expropriation risk (i.e., countries with weaker institutional environments compared to the home country).
SOEs are more risk-takers in their OFDIs because their home governments can back their OFDI operations (through government direct financial support or low-cost government capital) and support them in case of financial difficulties. Additionally, SOEs enjoy the political protection provided by their home government and may face lower expropriation risks in their OFDIs, particularly when those governments can exert some influence over weaker governments (Knutsen, Rygh, & Hveem, 2011; Ramasamy et al., 2012) .
The IB literature on multinational SOEs, more specifically on why SOE internationalize, what are their motivations to go abroad, and the managerial consequences of the SOEs' internationalization, is quite recent (Choudhury & Khanna, 2014; Duanmu, 2014; Liang et. al, 2014 ) and a number of issues regarding these companies remain understudied (CuervoCazurra et al., 2014) . Additionally, a limited number of previous studies have examined state ownership and internationalization decisions, and most of them focused on OFDIs by Chinese SOEs (Cui & Jiang, 2012; Ramasamy et al., 2012; Li, Sun, & Liu, 2006) .
Although, in economic terms, China has become increasingly market-oriented, politically speaking, it is still a single-party republic ruled by the Communist Party. Therefore, one cannot assume the Chinese government's relationship with their SOEs to be generalizable to that of other developing countries.
RESEARCH DESIGN
We followed Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin (1994) in our decision to adopt a case study approach. Given the complexity and underexplored condition of SOEs' internationalization, our goal in this study was exploratory in nature and based on grounded theory. We followed prior guidance for building grounded theory models and linking observations and analysis with theoretical insights from related fields (Glaser & Straus, 1967) .
Finally, single case design is suitable here as we are building propositions that can serve as a first step (Ghauri, 2004 ) to a later, more comprehensive study for testing and building a framework to explain the logic of SOEs' internationalization through OFDI. We develop our propositions based on in-depth longitudinal analyses of a large SOE in a global industry: Brazil's oil giant Petrobras. The case is revealing, providing useful insights (Ghauri, 2004; Yin 1994) in SOEs' internationalization, an area that has dominantly focused on Chinese SOEs (e.g., Cui & Jiang, 2012; Luo & Tung, 2007; Ramasamy et al., 2012) .
In addition to going deeper into the analysis of a single multinational SOE, we provide opportunities for comparison by giving examples based on previous case studies of internationalization through OFDI by SOEs from different countries. 
SAMPLE SELECTION
Three key criteria guided our case study selection: first, we selected an industry with SOEs that compete internationally. In the global oil industry, SOEs currently control approximately 90% of the world's oil reserves (Tordo, Tracy, & Arfaa, 2011, p. 11 ) and 75% of the world's oil production (Tordo et al., 2011, p. 11) . The
Petroleum Intelligence Weekly ranks 18 SOEs among the top 25 oil and gas reserves holders and producers (PIW, 2010) . Second, we sought to select an internationalizing SOE from an emerging market that has undergone significant pro-market reforms. Brazil met this requirement. Additionally, Brazil is the South America's largest country, with the world's 6 th largest GDP (World Bank, 2013) , and it ranks 9 th in world oil production (Tordo et al., 2011 
Data sources
Following grounded theory recommendations, we triangulated data from three different sources (Eisenhardt, 1989 
PETROBRAS' OUTWARD FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT STRATEGY
Petrobras' internationalization through OFDI followed closely the three phases of Brazil's economic transition. We summarize these three phases of Petrobras' OFDI strategy in Table 2 and elaborate each phase in further detail in the following sections. Exhibit 2
shows that Petrobras pursued three key strategies to expand its geographic scope during this post-deregulation phase. First, 81.25%
of its measures to engage in global expansion (i.e., non-home region, Banalieva & Dhanaraj, 2013) 
Phase II: Petrobras' defensive internationalization immediately after market liberalization: 1988-1997
The start of pro-market reforms in Brazil marked the beginning of a new OFDI motif for Petrobras -strategic asset-seeking, whereby the company engaged in multiple acquisitions and partnerships with foreign players in the energy and gas and refining/petrochemicals sectors (Exhibit 2). Thus, during this period, Petrobras followed a defensive internationalization strategy. The main goal of the federal government was to protect the company from the domestic economic crisis after economic liberalization, which involved political instability and fears of reform reversals.
Petrobras started an intense struggle for autonomy from the Brazilian government by intensifying the policy of self-sufficiency in oil production and increasing its international expansion (Campos, Tolmasquim, & Alveal, 2006; Musacchio, Goldberg, & Pinho, 2009 ).
However, as a direct result of the economic liberalization, some of Petrobras' downstream subsidiaries, particularly in petrochemicals, were privatized in the early 90s. The company shifted away from the typical strategy of the industry's major players, particularly supermajors such as Exxon-Mobil, Shell, BP-Amoco-Arco, Elf-Total-Fina, and Chevron-Texaco. These super-majors, besides maintaining vertically integrated structures, also had a diversified portfolio, as they pursued innovation and higher value added products such as fine chemicals.
In the early 1990s, besides the struggle with partial privatization, Petrobras also changed from being a technology user to a leading technology innovator (Dantas & Bell, 2009 ).
Phase III: Petrobras' strategic internationalization after oil sector deregulation in 1997
In the late 1990s, both the economic and political scenes stabilized and the Brazilian government embraced a series of institutional reforms in the oil sector. In 1997, the Oil Law was enacted, ending Petrobras' monopoly in Brazil and opening the oil industry to foreign rivals. Consequently, multinationals such as Shell, Exxon-Mobil, Texaco and BP started moving into Brazil, forcing Petrobras to implement internal changes and international expansion to stay competitive (Exhibit 2). 
PROPOSITIONS ON THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF SOES
The central premise of our propositions is that, over time, SOEs pursue multiple goals in international markets, depending on their domestic institutional environments. An SOEs' ability to achieve its international goals is moderated by its ability to have management autonomy from the government. Therefore, we propose that one of the key drivers of an SOE internationalization process is domestic pro-market reforms. SOE internationalization motivations depend on the risk level of the entry country and on institutional transformations in the SOE's home country.
We also suggest that the key managerial consequences of SOE internationalization are the adoption of a new managerial focus on more efficient workforce and more innovative products. Below we advance four propositions about each of these relations.
Pro-market reforms as a driver of SOE internationalization
As assets of their governments, SOEs have directly responded to the institutional changes in their domestic economies as a result of pro-market reforms occurring first at national-level (CuervoCazurra & Dau, 2009; Dau, 2012) and then at industry level. At national level, as pro-market reforms expanded, governments streamlined their economic agencies and functions by formulating policies that facilitate competition among market players (Cerny, 1997; Li, Sum, & Liu, 2006) . Internationalization was one way to stabilize SOE revenue streams and reduce over-exposure to domestic economic liberalization (Clifton et. al., 2011; Dau, 2012; Witt & Lewin, 2007) . As a result, in planning resource allocation, SOEs' managers have to be more concerned about market forces and customer satisfaction than state-led social goals such as full employment, for example (Cuervo-Cazurra & Dau, 2009 ).
At national level, after 1990, the Brazilian government also kept increasing the access of foreign competitors to the domestic market. As a result, SOEs and the government itself were forced to adopt internationalization as part of their new market-based strategic planning (Fleury & Fleury, 2011) . The "misalignment between firms' needs and home country institutional environments" (Witt & Lewin, 2007, p. 579) led SOEs to seek an escape from the highly turbulent domestic market and government resource constrains, pursuing new markets overseas (Witt & Lewin, 2007) . (Gabrielli, 2009: 03) . Additionally, as reported by Petrobras, "When our petrochemical subsidiaries were privatized (in the early 1990s), for example, we became essentially centered on the oil chain, in a strategy that was the opposite of that of the industry's super-majors (…). To be competitive, we needed a diversified portfolio, to pursue innovation and higher value added products, (…) and going out there to acquire companies is the fastest way to be able to compete in the global oil market (…)" [2] .
At industry level, the Brazilian state-run production system underwent deep restructuring with both fully and partial privatization as prescribed by the National Privatization Plan (Fleury & Fleury, 2011) . While keeping the country's main SOE (Petrobras) under state control, the Brazilian government allowed the entry of foreign competition in the oil sector, and created the National Petroleum Agency to regulate and monitor the oil industry's upstream activities. The Agency has been conducting yearly rounds to lease acreage for petroleum exploration rights under a concession regime (Rodriguez & Suslick, 2008) . As Petrobras reported in our interviews: "After the government broke the monopoly and opened the oil sector to international competition, we have not lost competitiveness. We learned from competition (…) After 1998, the level of investment in E&P and new technologies is actually high. And it is higher than the peak recorded just after the second oil shock, when we started producing in the Campos Basin" [4] . In a recent survey on Chinese OFDI of SOEs and private firms, Ramasamy et al. (2012) indicated that the riskier an entry country is, the greater the likelihood that a Chinese SOE will be attracted to the its natural resources; as to low-risk countries, Chinese SOEs are more likely to approach them for technology or strategic purposes.
Chinese private firms were portrayed as relatively more risk-averse, and their OFDIs were more often motivated by market-seeking strategies. In other words, government ownership impacts risk willingness in OFDIs, and the motivation for an OFDI will depend of the entry country's risk level (Ramasamy et al., 2012) . Additionally, SOEs' internationalization is typically conducted through acquisitions or greenfield ventures (Ramasamy et al., 2012) .
SOEs can handle OFDI in countries rich in natural resources, yet with poor institutions, high corruption, inequality, and absence rates, or poor legal guarantee to property rights. On the other hand, political stability, pro-business institutions, and strong intellectual property laws can significantly influence innovation within a country; SOE will invest in such more stable countries in pursuit of technology and more strategic assets (Ramasamy et al., 2012) .
In its initial internationalization, Petrobras' strategy comprised more opportunistic, risk-taking OFDIs in countries like Angola, Libya, and Iraq, where it sought resources to bring home (Exhibit 2). During the 1980s and after the introduction of pro-market reforms, Petrobras gradually shifted its focus to more politically stable countries, in search of strategic assets.
In order to better understand whether SOEs were both risk-taking and risk-averse in their OFDIs, we asked Petrobras' head of the board for Americas, Africa and Eurasia what were the motivations for the company's OFDIs: "There were lots of motivations that explain our operations abroad, for example… diversifying our portfolio, reducing our cost of capital, generating cash flow in stable currency, contributing to the growth and profitability of Petrobras, bringing resources to the Brazilian industry, to increasing Brazilian influence, enhancing Petrobras brand.
[…] "In the beginning, we were after oil reserves. Brazil was growing 10 or 15% in 1970s and oil demand was high. [...] . In the late 1990s, we changed an attitude of opportunism in international markets for one of systematic, strategic international operations.
In search of value creation, and taking advantage of resource synergies, most of our businesses are now in the Southern Cone.
On the west coast of Africa, Gulf of Mexico, and other parts of the world where we seek oil, we use our core competencies in oil exploration in deep water". [2] In sum, we propose that SOEs can be both risk-taking and risk-averse players at various stages of their internationalization, and that their motivations to conduct OFDIs will depend on the entry country's risk level (Ramasamy et al., 2012) . SOEs view political risks differently than private firms. SOEs tend to rely more on intergovernmental negotiations as the basis of their decisions.
Uncertainties like expropriation and contract failures may be less likely to occur when investments are based on negotiations between two governments (Ramasamy et al., 2012; CuervoCazurra et al., 2014) . As to OFDIs in more stable countries, the SOE can be risk-averse as it enjoys stronger pro-business institutions while seeking more sophisticated assets. We hypothesize that:
Proposition 2: In high-risk countries, SOEs' internationalization tends to be motivated by the pursuit of natural resources.
Proposition 3: In low-risk countries, SOEs' internationalization tends to be motivated by the pursuit of strategic asset.
OUTCOMES OF SOES' INTERNATIONALIZATION
We propose that the aforementioned driving factors and motivations enhance SOEs' internationalization, leading, in turn, to two core outcomes: (1) the adoption of a new managerial focus on more efficient workforce; and (2) more innovative products.
New managerial focus on more efficient workforce and more innovative products
Most countries that underwent pro-market reforms also experienced intense reforms in the public management system, which promoted greater efficiency and improved service quality, thus changing bureaucratic structures and slow managerial processes (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011) . SOEs have forms of management and organization that are market-oriented and similar to private companies (Narver & Slater, 1990) . The internationalization occurring after pro-market reforms has led SOEs to emphasize their market orientation, strengthening their focus on customers and competitors, and on the integration of organizational functions (Walker, Brewer, Boyne, & Avellaneda, 2011; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011) . Thus it is our view that the adoption of a new managerial focus on more efficient workforce and more innovative products are consequences of SOEs' internationalization (Walker et. al, 2011) .
First, we suggest that greater internationalization teaches SOEs' managers to focus on recruiting and maintaining a more efficient workforce. Therefore, such an internationalization teaches SOEs' managers to realize that their workforce has to be competent, specialized, attentive to the customers' needs, and not redundant, in order to compete successfully in international markets. For instance, Petrobras progressively increased its aim to reduce redundancy as it entered new, foreign markets. "Extensive training and re-training programs have been organized to help employees adapt to the challenges of new work demands after we went abroad" [3] . Internationalization also brought newer, more efficient hiring practices into the company. Since the mid1990s, new hires are short-term, renewable contracts, rather than life-long positions. Foreign workers are also hired in countries where Petrobras has operations and typically follows private property law, particularly in the cases where it has acquired a private-owned company. "Sometimes, it is less bureaucratic to hire people abroad than home" [3] . "Petrobras brings expats from their international subsidiaries to the headquarters as a frequent policy of knowledge management in specialized human resource" [1] As a comparison to the Petrobras case, Vattenfall AB (Andersson & Latef, 2010) , a Swedish energy SOE, is a clear example that greater SOE internationalization promotes managerial changes in terms of getting a more efficient workforce. Vattenfall started its international expansion in 1996 and since then the company has rationalized its organizational structure to increase efficiency, with more autonomy to the CEO and board of directors, and new, more efficient recruiting practices, particularly through a more technical, meritocratic logic over political appointment (Andersson & Latef, 2010, p. 23) .
Second, we suggest that greater internationalization teaches SOE managers to focus on better, more innovative products to meet growing consumer expectation in foreign markets in terms of customer orientation, competitor orientation, and inter-functional coordination (Narver & Slater, 1990) . Exposure to international markets and customer demands teaches internationalizing SOEs how to be internationally innovative. We define international innovativeness as the capacity to develop and introduce new processes, products, services, or ideas into international markets (Hurley & Hult, 1998) . Because internationalizing SOEs' decisions may rely heavily on local sources of information, and innovation may rely on internal resources, the role of the internationalization process -and the exposure it entails to dynamic international markets -appears to be crucial for a company, particularly an SOE introducing innovation into foreign markets (Girma, Gong, & Görg, 2008) . In Petrobras' case, the opening of new markets and the intensification of international acquisitions have brought to the company new goods and methods of production, R&D, and development of knowledge networks (Dantas & Bell, 2009 (Dantas & Bell, 2009 ). Important international partnerships were also made, which brought international consolidation. "In terms of internal technological capabilities, Petrobras shifted dramatically from an imitative technology-user to a leading player at the international innovation frontier. By the mid-1990s, Petrobras was playing a leading role in the international industry in creating and applying totally novel technologies in production and drilling water depths" (Dantas & Bell, 2009, p. 831 ). The company is now "the largest investor in R&D among the oil majors and a recognized leader in deeper and ultra-deeper water exploration and production" (Tordo et al., 2011, p. 60 Statoil is a Norwegian multinational oil SOE that has learned innovation from its internationalization process. It is a fully integrated oil company with operations in thirty-six countries.
The SOE have played an important role in the development of local content.
Overall, these arguments suggest that greater SOE internationalization leads to greater modernizing efforts in SOE management approaches regarding labor and product. Thus, we present the proposition below.
Proposition 4: Greater SOE internationalization promotes a new managerial focus on more efficient labor and more innovative products.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Our research extends current theories of firm internationalization in two key ways. We integrate public management and IB theories to develop propositions that combine the questions of why SOEs internationalize and what are the motivations and the managerial consequences of SOEs' internationalization.
In our attempt to answer why SOEs internationalize, we observed three distinct phases in SOE's internationalization through OFDI: experimental, defensive, and strategic. We further argued that these three phases of internationalization are closely aligned and co-evolve (Cantwell, Dunning, & Lundan, 2010; Suhomlinova, 2006) with the phases of institutional transition in emerging markets: pre-liberalization, after liberalization (but before industry deregulation), and after industry deregulation.
As pro-market reforms were introduced, the state began an active withdrawal from the economy, and local companies, including SOEs, were exposed to international competition and government economic constrains. As to SOEs in particular, they may seek international expansion according to the institutional transformations in the home country and to achieve economic independence from the government (Choudhury & Khanna, 2014 ), as we saw on phase two of Petrobras' internationalization. Thus, in line with the theoretical contributions of Cantwell et. al, (2010) on the co-evolution of MNEs and the institutional environment, we complemented and extended the Uppsala perspective of internationalization (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977) . The Uppsala model (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977) emphasizes that the phases in firms' internationalization are a consequence of their learning capabilities as opposed to external, government-induced institutional transformations. Similarly, we complemented and extended Dunning's Eclectic Paradigm (Dunning, 2001) , which pays less attention to the separate internationalization phases that firms undergo or how they co-evolve with transitions in the external environment. Lastly, we also extended public management theory according to which SOEs do not have to internationalize (e.g., Hood, 1995; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011; Vernon, 1979) . Instead, we conceptualized and provided a concrete example of a leading SOE from an emerging market operating in a global industry.
Second, with regard to the motivations (Dunning 2001) for SOEs' internationalization, we extended public management and IB theories of internationalization by highlighting that SOEs are assumed to be either risk-seeking (public management theory, case, the risk-seeking behavior is manifested both in terms of the political regime (dictatorship vs. democracy) in the countries the SOE expanded into and the geographic location (regional or global) of these countries. In terms of political orientation, most of the countries the SOE expanded into during this initial phase of internationalization were other undemocratic regimes, except for the U.S. (Table 2 ). In terms of geographic location, half of these countries were lower-income risky markets (Angola, Libya, and Iraq -see Table 2 ) outside the home region. In Petrobras'
case, the ongoing pro-market reforms domestically propelled the SOE to expand into other lower-income countries within its home region. This allowed the company to reap the benefits of internationalization and expand market share, however, at a lower cost than if it were to expand globally (Banalieva & Dhanaraj, 2013) . We also proposed that SOEs shifted their behavior towards more risky, international, geographically distant projects on Phase III, i.e., during their strategic OFDI. Here, risk-seeking behavior as a result of industry deregulation at home propel SOEs to look to expanding into higher-income countries globally (Table 2) .
With regard to the question of "what are the managerial consequences of SOEs internationalization", we propose that greater SOE internationalization leads to greater efforts to modernize SOE managers' approaches concerning their managerial workforce and product innovation. SOE managers operating under economic liberalization in general, and industry deregulation in particular, have to more actively pursue foreign market learning opportunities that can help these managers adapt their focus to the new market reality. For instance, SOE managers can appoint a board of directors that will encourage internationalization and intensify product innovation.
Limitations and future research
Our study is subject to three key caveats, which provide interesting venues for future research. First, while there is a plethora of research on the institutional environment in China (e.g. Cui & Jiang, 2012; Luo & Tung, 2007; Luo, Xue, & Han, 2010; Ramasamy et al., 2012) , we analyzed instead the pro-market reforms development in a key but under-studied emerging market, Brazil. We encourage future research to test the generalizability of our propositions on multiple industries and SOEs from multiple emerging markets.
It would also be interesting for future research to expand our propositions into a framework and differentiate between internationalization strategies of SOEs based in single-party communist countries like China vs. SOEs based in multi-party democratic countries like Brazil, Bulgaria, Nigeria, South Africa, etc. Although each of these countries underwent economic promarket reforms, they differ in their political transformations.
These differences in political transitions may alter the length and intensity of the different phases of SOEs' internationalization, as well as the focus of the SOE on its different types of managerial outcomes.
Second, we discovered that, in the context of SOEs' internationalization to expand its geographic scope, industry-level deregulation might play a bigger role than protectionism prior pro-market reforms: (1) globally in low-income countries seeking resources; and (2) into specifically high-income developed nations globally. These are interesting results because prior research on the regional/global strategies of firms has paid far less attention to explicitly differentiate between lower-income vs. higher-income countries in the regional and global segments. In fact, we saw that when Petrobras decided to enter the global markets, it entered high-income developed countries in 89% of cases and mostly during its Phase III of strategic internationalization strategy.
Thus, we encourage future research to expand ours by analyzing in greater detail the regional and global geographic scope and implications for performance (Banalieva & Dhanaraj, 2013) said Sérgio Lazzarini, who has written widely on Brazil's state capitalism (Romero, 2014) . Secondary data on media investigation would be more appropriate for this kind of research, because SOEs' managers would not be willing to talk about these entrusted purposes of SOE internationalization.
